Microsoft Authenticator icon

Microsoft Authenticator data API: MFA, passkeys and passwordless sessions

Microsoft Corporation · Identity

Microsoft Authenticator is Microsoft Corporation's mobile identity app: it approves sign-ins to work and school accounts on Microsoft Entra ID (formerly Azure Active Directory), holds personal Microsoft accounts, and generates time-based one-time passcodes for any third-party service that accepts them. The screen users see most is the sign-in approval prompt — a push notification arrives, the user types the number shown on the sign-in page (number matching), checks which app and location the request came from, and approves or denies, optionally behind an app-lock PIN or biometric check. Around that prompt the app maintains rotating TOTP codes for every added account, offers passwordless phone sign-in to Entra ID once the handset has registered its own sign-in key, stores device-bound FIDO2 passkeys for the work account, and removes accounts or sign-in methods when a phone is retired. IT administrators roll it out and tune it through Entra ID authentication-methods policy and tenant security defaults, which decide whether number matching, location and app context display, software OATH codes, approval PINs and passkeys are switched on — making it the standard second factor for organizations running Microsoft 365 and Azure; the listing here covers the US. In the identity and multi-factor authentication category it competes with Google Authenticator, Twilio Authy, Cisco Duo Mobile and Okta Verify.

Number-matched push approvals are the recurring record here. Enrolling a handset as an MFA method returns the account's AccountName, OathSecret, PhoneAppDetailId and DeviceName, plus tenant routing hints such as TenantCountryCode, ReplicationScope, RoutingHint and CurrentDefaultMethod. Each pending challenge then arrives carrying firstEntropyNumber, secondEntropyNumber and thirdEntropyNumber match digits, richContextDetails sign-in context, fraudBlock and fraudAllowed flags and an isAppLockRequired switch; the user's decision goes back as authenticationResult with the current oathTokenCounter, isAppLockUsed and, when the tenant asks for it, locationData. Push registrations rotate through oldDeviceToken and newDeviceToken pairs whenever the platform refreshes the notification token.

Around those events sits the policy layer that shapes them: per-user authenticator settings such as numberMatchingRequiredState, displayLocationInformationRequiredState, displayAppInformationRequiredState, isSoftwareTotpEnabled, isEnforceApprovalPinEnabled and passkeyProfiles; the tenant security-defaults isEnabled flag; and the organization record's countryLetterCode and dataBoundary. Passwordless phone sign-in adds its own session list carrying sessionId, sessionType, requestTime, expirationTime, entropy1 through entropy3, authDetails and fidoChallenge, while passkey enrollment yields WebAuthn creation options (challenge, pubKeyCredParams, authenticatorSelection) and a stored method described by aaGuid, model, attestationLevel, passkeyType and createdDateTime.

Identity and security teams build on these fields: reconciling a workforce MFA device inventory from registrations and token rotations; verifying number-match and location policy by comparing the policy flags with firstEntropyNumber and returnLocationData on live challenges; watching pending passwordless sessions and completing them with a signed assertion once the user confirms the match code; and running the passkey lifecycle on Entra ID, from attestation upload to method deletion when a device is retired. openData Studio turns this enrollment, challenge, policy and passkey data into callable open data for those inventory, policy-check, session-monitoring and passkey integrations.

Screenshots

  • Microsoft Authenticator screenshot 1
  • Microsoft Authenticator screenshot 2
  • Microsoft Authenticator screenshot 3
  • Microsoft Authenticator screenshot 4
  • Microsoft Authenticator screenshot 5
  • Microsoft Authenticator screenshot 6
  • Microsoft Authenticator screenshot 7
  • Microsoft Authenticator screenshot 8

API surface

The endpoints and request/response examples below are reconstructed from the app's interface — illustrative, not a live capture.

  • Issue an OAuth 2.0 access token

    POST /v1/oauth/token osint

    Exchanges an authorization code or refresh_token for the Bearer access_token later attached to policy, passkey, session and device-registration calls.

    Auth: Public-client token request. Body carries grant_type (authorization_code, refresh_token or srv_challenge), client_id and scope. The returned access_token is sent as Authorization: Bearer on the policy, passkey and session calls.

    • grant_type
    • client_id
    • code
    • redirect_uri
    • scope
    • token_type
    • expires_in
    • ext_expires_in
    • access_token
    • refresh_token
    • id_token
    POST /v1/oauth/token HTTP/1.1
    Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
    
    grant_type=authorization_code&client_id=11112222-3333-4444-5555-666677778888&code=0.AXEA...&redirect_uri=msauth://com.example.mfaapp/callback&scope=https://directory.example.net/.default offline_access
    {
      "token_type": "Bearer",
      "scope": "https://directory.example.net/.default",
      "expires_in": 3599,
      "ext_expires_in": 3599,
      "access_token": "eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9.example",
      "refresh_token": "0.AXEA.example",
      "id_token": "eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9.example"
    }
  • Register Authenticator as MFA method

    POST /v1/mfa/devices/register osint

    Enrolls this Android handset as a Microsoft Authenticator MFA method and returns the account name, TOTP oath secret, phoneAppDetailId and tenant routing hints used by later calls.

    Auth: Authorization: Bearer access token for the work or school account. Also sends app and device headers (app name and version, device platform and an action header) plus a hash of the push registration token.

    • AccountName
    • GroupKey
    • OathSecret
    • PhoneAppDetailId
    • MfaServerInUse
    • IsDeviceTokenValidationSuccessful
    • IsOathTokenEnabled
    • ReplicationScope
    • RoutingHint
    • TenantCountryCode
    • CurrentDefaultMethod
    • UserCredentialPolicyProto
    • DeviceName
    • DeviceToken
    • NotificationType
    • AppPackageName
    POST /v1/mfa/devices/register HTTP/1.1
    Authorization: Bearer eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9.example
    Content-Type: application/xml
    X-App-Name: Authenticator
    X-App-Version: 6.2609.6214
    X-Device-Platform: Android
    
    <RegisterDeviceRequest>
      <Version>1.0</Version>
      <AppPackageName>com.example.mfaapp</AppPackageName>
      <AuthenticatorFlavor>Authenticator</AuthenticatorFlavor>
      <DeviceName>Pixel 8</DeviceName>
      <DeviceTag>Android</DeviceTag>
      <DeviceToken>fcm-registration-token</DeviceToken>
      <NotificationType>FCM</NotificationType>
      <PhoneAppVersion>6.2609.6214</PhoneAppVersion>
      <RequestId>9c2e1a44-7b11-4d90-9e3a-2f0c8b1d4e55</RequestId>
      <UpdateDefaultMethod>true</UpdateDefaultMethod>
      <Uses>Notification Oath</Uses>
    </RegisterDeviceRequest>
    {
      "AccountName": "[email protected]",
      "GroupKey": "g-7f2c91aa",
      "OathSecret": "JBSWY3DPEHPK3PXP",
      "PhoneAppDetailId": "pad-8e21c0",
      "MfaServerInUse": false,
      "IsDeviceTokenValidationSuccessful": true,
      "IsOathTokenEnabled": true,
      "ReplicationScope": "NAM",
      "RoutingHint": "contoso.example",
      "TenantCountryCode": "US",
      "CurrentDefaultMethod": "PhoneAppNotification",
      "UserCredentialPolicyProto": "CgNhcHA="
    }
  • Discover MFA service endpoints

    POST /v1/mfa/endpoints/resolve opendata

    Returns the regional MFA relay URLs and replicationScopes the phone app should use for subsequent MFA poll and approve calls.

    Auth: Device-bound MFA headers: XML content type, app name and version, device platform, a device-token header and an action header selecting the endpoint-discovery request.

    • version
    • defaultUrl
    • url
    • endpoints
    • replicationScopes
    POST /v1/mfa/endpoints/resolve HTTP/1.1
    Content-Type: application/xml
    X-MFA-Action: getEndpoints
    X-App-Name: Authenticator
    X-Device-Platform: Android
    
    <mfaMessage version="1.6">
      <request request-id="b41c0e22-11aa-4c01-9f10-88c0aa11bb22" async="0" language="en">
        <getEndpointsRequest/>
      </request>
    </mfaMessage>
    {
      "version": "1.6",
      "defaultUrl": "https://mfa.example.net/v1/mfa/relay",
      "url": "https://mfa.example.net/v1/mfa/relay",
      "endpoints": {
        "NAM": "https://mfa-nam.example.net/v1/mfa/relay",
        "EUR": "https://mfa-eur.example.net/v1/mfa/relay"
      },
      "replicationScopes": "NAM,EUR"
    }
  • Poll pending MFA notifications

    POST /v1/mfa/challenges/poll osint

    Asks the MFA service whether a sign-in is waiting for this device and returns the username, groupKey, oathCounter and phoneAppDetailId for the pending challenge.

    Auth: Device-bound MFA headers plus optional tenant routing headers (tenant id, replication scope, routing hint and tenant country) from the registered account. An action header selects the pending-challenge check.

    • result
    • groupKey
    • username
    • oathCounter
    • padUrl
    • phoneAppDetailId
    • dosPreventer
    • deviceToken
    • previousDeviceToken
    • AuthenticatorFlavor
    POST /v1/mfa/challenges/poll HTTP/1.1
    Content-Type: application/xml
    X-MFA-Action: checkPendingChallenge
    X-MFA-Interactive: true
    X-Tenant-Id: 72f988bf-86f1-41af-91ab-2d7cd011db47
    X-Routing-Hint: contoso.example
    
    <checkPendingChallengeRequest>
      <dosPreventer>dp-9f31</dosPreventer>
      <deviceToken notificationType="fcm">fcm-registration-token</deviceToken>
      <previousDeviceToken>fcm-registration-token-old</previousDeviceToken>
      <version>6.2609.6214</version>
      <osVersion>14</osVersion>
      <AuthenticatorFlavor>Authenticator</AuthenticatorFlavor>
    </checkPendingChallengeRequest>
    {
      "result": "NotificationWaiting",
      "groupKey": "g-7f2c91aa",
      "username": "[email protected]",
      "oathCounter": 48211,
      "padUrl": "https://mfa.example.net/v1/mfa/relay",
      "phoneAppDetailId": "pad-8e21c0"
    }
  • Fetch MFA challenge context

    POST /v1/mfa/challenges/context osint

    Loads the pending MFA challenge shown on the approve screen: number-matching entropy digits, sign-in context, user objectId, tenant, fraud flags and whether app lock is required.

    Auth: Device-bound MFA headers; an action header selects the challenge-context request. Tenant routing headers from the registered account are included when present.

    • responseGuid
    • mode
    • fraudBlock
    • fraudAllowed
    • groupKey
    • phoneAppDetailId
    • username
    • tenantId
    • objectId
    • accountName
    • firstEntropyNumber
    • secondEntropyNumber
    • thirdEntropyNumber
    • sasSessionId
    • richContextDetails
    • returnLocationData
    • isAppLockRequired
    • pinChangeRequired
    • oathTokenEnabled
    • oathCounter
    • replicationScope
    • routingHint
    • tenantCountryCode
    • userCredentialPolicyProto
    POST /v1/mfa/challenges/context HTTP/1.1
    Content-Type: application/xml
    X-MFA-Action: getChallengeContext
    X-Tenant-Id: 72f988bf-86f1-41af-91ab-2d7cd011db47
    
    <challengeContextRequest>
      <challengeContext>
        <guid>3fa85f64-5717-4562-b3fc-2c963f66afa6</guid>
        <oathCode>483921</oathCode>
        <needDosPreventer>yes</needDosPreventer>
        <deviceToken>fcm-registration-token</deviceToken>
        <version>6.2609.6214</version>
        <osVersion>14</osVersion>
      </challengeContext>
    </challengeContextRequest>
    {
      "responseGuid": "3fa85f64-5717-4562-b3fc-2c963f66afa6",
      "mode": "Push",
      "fraudBlock": false,
      "fraudAllowed": true,
      "groupKey": "g-7f2c91aa",
      "phoneAppDetailId": "pad-8e21c0",
      "username": "[email protected]",
      "tenantId": "72f988bf-86f1-41af-91ab-2d7cd011db47",
      "objectId": "84b12a9c-0e33-4d1a-9f44-11aa22bb33cc",
      "accountName": "[email protected]",
      "firstEntropyNumber": "14",
      "secondEntropyNumber": "67",
      "thirdEntropyNumber": "32",
      "sasSessionId": "sas-9c01",
      "richContextDetails": "Sign-in from Chrome on Windows",
      "returnLocationData": true,
      "isAppLockRequired": true,
      "oathTokenEnabled": true,
      "oathCounter": 48212,
      "replicationScope": "NAM",
      "routingHint": "contoso.example",
      "tenantCountryCode": "US",
      "userCredentialPolicyProto": "CgNhcHA="
    }
  • Submit MFA approve or deny

    POST /v1/mfa/challenges/result osint

    Posts the user's approve or deny decision for a pending MFA challenge, including whether app lock was used and the current OATH counter.

    Auth: Device-bound MFA headers; an action header selects the challenge-result submission. May include locationData when the challenge asked for it.

    • guid
    • authenticationResult
    • oldDeviceToken
    • newDeviceToken
    • oathTokenCounter
    • isAppLockUsed
    • completedInteractively
    • locationData
    • result
    POST /v1/mfa/challenges/result HTTP/1.1
    Content-Type: application/xml
    X-MFA-Action: submitChallengeResult
    
    <challengeResultRequest>
      <challengeContext>
        <guid>3fa85f64-5717-4562-b3fc-2c963f66afa6</guid>
        <needDosPreventer>no</needDosPreventer>
        <deviceToken>fcm-registration-token</deviceToken>
        <version>6.2609.6214</version>
        <osVersion>14</osVersion>
      </challengeContext>
      <authenticationResult>0</authenticationResult>
      <oathTokenCounter>48212</oathTokenCounter>
      <isAppLockUsed>true</isAppLockUsed>
      <completedInteractively>true</completedInteractively>
    </challengeResultRequest>
    {
      "result": "Success",
      "guid": "3fa85f64-5717-4562-b3fc-2c963f66afa6"
    }
  • Validate MFA PIN on approve

    POST /v1/mfa/challenges/pin osint

    Submits the user's app PIN (and optional number-match digit) when the MFA challenge requires PIN validation before approve.

    Auth: Device-bound MFA headers; an action header selects PIN validation. Body carries pin (optionally stored=yes), selectedEntropyNumber and isAppLockUsed.

    • guid
    • pin
    • stored
    • authenticate
    • oathCounter
    • completedInteractively
    • selectedEntropyNumber
    • isAppLockUsed
    • pinRetries
    • pinChangeRequired
    • result
    POST /v1/mfa/challenges/pin HTTP/1.1
    Content-Type: application/xml
    X-MFA-Action: validatePin
    
    <pinValidationRequest>
      <challengeContext>
        <guid>3fa85f64-5717-4562-b3fc-2c963f66afa6</guid>
        <needDosPreventer>no</needDosPreventer>
        <deviceToken>fcm-registration-token</deviceToken>
        <version>6.2609.6214</version>
        <osVersion>14</osVersion>
      </challengeContext>
      <pin stored="no">4821</pin>
      <authenticate>yes</authenticate>
      <oathCounter>48212</oathCounter>
      <completedInteractively>yes</completedInteractively>
      <selectedEntropyNumber>14</selectedEntropyNumber>
      <isAppLockUsed>yes</isAppLockUsed>
    </pinValidationRequest>
    {
      "result": "Success",
      "guid": "3fa85f64-5717-4562-b3fc-2c963f66afa6",
      "pinRetries": 3,
      "pinChangeRequired": false
    }
  • Rotate push device token

    POST /v1/devices/push-token opendata

    Tells the notification service to replace the previous push registration token so push MFA keeps working after the mobile platform refreshes it.

    Auth: Device-bound MFA headers; an action header selects the token-change request and the call is marked non-interactive.

    • dosPreventer
    • oldDeviceToken
    • newDeviceToken
    • notificationType
    • replicationScopes
    • version
    • osVersion
    • result
    POST /v1/devices/push-token HTTP/1.1
    Content-Type: application/xml
    X-MFA-Action: changeDeviceToken
    X-MFA-Interactive: false
    
    <deviceTokenChangeRequest>
      <dosPreventer>dp-9f31</dosPreventer>
      <oldDeviceToken>fcm-registration-token-old</oldDeviceToken>
      <newDeviceToken notificationType="fcm">fcm-registration-token-new</newDeviceToken>
      <version>6.2609.6214</version>
      <osVersion>14</osVersion>
      <replicationScopes>NAM</replicationScopes>
    </deviceTokenChangeRequest>
    {
      "result": "Success",
      "newDeviceToken": "fcm-registration-token-new"
    }
  • Read authenticator methods policy

    GET /v1/accounts/{id}/mfa-policy opendata

    Reads the user's Microsoft Authenticator policy, including number matching, location display, software TOTP and companion-app flags that drive the in-app MFA experience.

    Auth: Authorization: Bearer directory access token obtained for the signed-in work account.

    • authenticationMethod
    • isEnabled
    • isRequired
    • settings
    • authenticationMode
    • companionAppAllowedState
    • numberMatchingRequiredState
    • displayAppInformationRequiredState
    • displayLocationInformationRequiredState
    • isSoftwareTotpEnabled
    • isAttestationEnforced
    • isEnforceApprovalPinEnabled
    • isSelfServiceRegistrationAllowed
    • passkeyProfiles
    GET /v1/accounts/84b12a9c-0e33-4d1a-9f44-11aa22bb33cc/mfa-policy HTTP/1.1
    Authorization: Bearer eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9.example
    {
      "value": [
        {
          "authenticationMethod": "microsoftAuthenticator",
          "isEnabled": true,
          "isRequired": true,
          "settings": {
            "authenticationMode": "any",
            "companionAppAllowedState": "enabled",
            "numberMatchingRequiredState": "enabled",
            "displayAppInformationRequiredState": "enabled",
            "displayLocationInformationRequiredState": "enabled",
            "isSoftwareTotpEnabled": true,
            "isAttestationEnforced": false,
            "isEnforceApprovalPinEnabled": false,
            "isSelfServiceRegistrationAllowed": true,
            "passkeyProfiles": []
          }
        }
      ]
    }
  • Read security defaults tenant policy

    GET /v1/tenants/security-defaults opendata

    Reads whether the tenant has identity security defaults enabled, which changes how the app presents MFA registration and approval flows.

    Auth: Authorization: Bearer directory access token.

    • id
    • displayName
    • description
    • isEnabled
    GET /v1/tenants/security-defaults HTTP/1.1
    Authorization: Bearer eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9.example
    {
      "id": "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000005",
      "displayName": "Security Defaults",
      "description": "Security defaults provides preconfigured security settings.",
      "isEnabled": true
    }
  • Get FIDO2 passkey creation options

    GET /v1/accounts/{id}/passkeys/creation-options osint

    Fetches WebAuthn credential-creation options so the app can mint a platform passkey for the signed-in Entra user.

    Auth: Authorization: Bearer directory access token.

    • publicKey
    • rp
    • user
    • challenge
    • pubKeyCredParams
    • timeout
    • authenticatorSelection
    • authenticatorAttachment
    • userVerification
    • requireResidentKey
    • attestation
    • hmacCreateSecret
    • credentialProtectionPolicy
    GET /v1/accounts/84b12a9c-0e33-4d1a-9f44-11aa22bb33cc/passkeys/creation-options?challengeTimeoutInMinutes=5 HTTP/1.1
    Authorization: Bearer eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9.example
    {
      "publicKey": {
        "rp": {"id": "passkeys.example.net", "name": "Example IDP"},
        "user": {"id": "84b12a9c-0e33-4d1a-9f44-11aa22bb33cc", "name": "[email protected]", "displayName": "Alex Contoso"},
        "challenge": "dGhpc2lzYWNoYWxsZW5nZQ",
        "pubKeyCredParams": [{"type": "public-key", "alg": -7}],
        "timeout": 300000,
        "authenticatorSelection": {"authenticatorAttachment": "platform", "userVerification": "required", "requireResidentKey": true},
        "attestation": "direct",
        "extensions": {"hmacCreateSecret": true, "credentialProtectionPolicy": "userVerificationRequired"}
      }
    }
  • Register FIDO2 passkey

    POST /v1/accounts/{id}/passkeys osint

    Uploads the platform authenticator attestation so Entra ID stores a new FIDO2 method on the user.

    Auth: Authorization: Bearer directory access token.

    • displayName
    • publicKeyCredential
    • id
    • rawId
    • type
    • attestationObject
    • clientDataJSON
    • createdDateTime
    • aaGuid
    • model
    • attestationLevel
    • passkeyType
    • attestationCertificates
    POST /v1/accounts/84b12a9c-0e33-4d1a-9f44-11aa22bb33cc/passkeys HTTP/1.1
    Authorization: Bearer eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9.example
    Content-Type: application/json
    
    {
      "displayName": "Pixel 8",
      "publicKeyCredential": {
        "id": "cred-aa11",
        "rawId": "Y3JlZC1hYTEx",
        "type": "public-key",
        "response": {
          "attestationObject": "o2NmbXRkbm9uZWdhdHRTdG10",
          "clientDataJSON": "eyJ0eXBlIjoid2ViYXV0aG4uY3JlYXRlIn0"
        }
      }
    }
    {
      "id": "fido-method-01",
      "displayName": "Pixel 8",
      "createdDateTime": "2026-09-29T12:04:11Z",
      "aaGuid": "ea9b8d66-4d01-1d21-3ce4-b6b48cb575d4",
      "model": "Pixel 8",
      "attestationLevel": "attested",
      "passkeyType": "deviceBound",
      "attestationCertificates": []
    }
  • Delete Authenticator MFA method

    DELETE /v1/accounts/{id}/mfa-methods/{methodId} osint

    Removes a registered Microsoft Authenticator method from the user when the account is deleted or the device is unregistered in-app.

    Auth: Authorization: Bearer directory access token.

    • id
    • methodId
    • status
    DELETE /v1/accounts/84b12a9c-0e33-4d1a-9f44-11aa22bb33cc/mfa-methods/pad-8e21c0 HTTP/1.1
    Authorization: Bearer eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9.example
    {
      "status": 204
    }
  • Delete FIDO2 passkey method

    DELETE /v1/accounts/{id}/passkeys/{methodId} osint

    Removes a registered FIDO2 / passkey method from the user when the passkey is deleted in the app.

    Auth: Authorization: Bearer directory access token.

    • id
    • methodId
    • status
    DELETE /v1/accounts/84b12a9c-0e33-4d1a-9f44-11aa22bb33cc/passkeys/fido-method-01 HTTP/1.1
    Authorization: Bearer eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9.example
    {
      "status": 204
    }
  • Read organization data boundary

    GET /v1/tenants/current opendata

    Reads the signed-in tenant's organization record so the app can honor the regional data boundary (dataBoundary) when uploading diagnostic logs.

    Auth: Authorization: Bearer directory access token obtained for the signed-in work account.

    • id
    • displayName
    • countryLetterCode
    • dataBoundary
    GET /v1/tenants/current HTTP/1.1
    Authorization: Bearer eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9.example
    {
      "value": [
        {
          "id": "72f988bf-86f1-41af-91ab-2d7cd011db47",
          "displayName": "Contoso",
          "countryLetterCode": "US",
          "dataBoundary": "Global"
        }
      ]
    }
  • List passwordless sign-in sessions

    GET /v1/signin/sessions osint

    Lists pending passwordless phone sign-in sessions for the account, including number-match digits, the FIDO challenge and the requesting client details.

    Auth: Authorization: Bearer access token. Also sends client correlation headers: a request id plus client SKU and client name.

    • sessionsList
    • username
    • userObjectIdHash
    • code
    • sessionId
    • sessionType
    • requestTime
    • expirationTime
    • audience
    • entropy1
    • entropy2
    • entropy3
    • authDetails
    • tenantId
    • userCredentialPolicy
    • phoneAppDetails
    • fidoChallenge
    GET /v1/signin/sessions HTTP/1.1
    Authorization: Bearer eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9.example
    client-request-id: 5e2a1c90-44bb-4d11-a0e1-77aa11bb22cc
    X-Client-SKU: authenticator.android
    X-Client-Name: AuthenticatorAndroid
    {
      "sessionsList": [
        {
          "session": {
            "username": "[email protected]",
            "userObjectIdHash": "a11c0e22",
            "code": "14",
            "sessionId": "sess-01",
            "sessionType": "Passwordless",
            "requestTime": 1759142400,
            "expirationTime": 1759142700,
            "audience": "https://idp.example.net",
            "entropy1": 14,
            "entropy2": 67,
            "entropy3": 32,
            "authDetails": "Chrome on Windows",
            "tenantId": "72f988bf-86f1-41af-91ab-2d7cd011db47",
            "userCredentialPolicy": "CgNhcHA=",
            "phoneAppDetails": "pad-8e21c0",
            "fidoChallenge": "dGhpc2lzYWNoYWxsZW5nZQ"
          }
        }
      ]
    }
  • Approve passwordless sign-in session

    POST /v1/signin/sessions/approve osint

    Approves or denies a pending passwordless phone-sign-in session after the user confirms the number match or provides a FIDO assertion.

    Auth: Authorization: Bearer access token. Form body carries a key assertion or a FIDO assertion (fidoassertion) plus sessionid, sessionstate, sessiontype and userobjectid.

    • sessionid
    • sessionstate
    • sessiontype
    • userobjectid
    • assertion
    • fidoassertion
    • entropy
    • oathcounter
    • app_state
    • deviceid
    • success
    POST /v1/signin/sessions/approve HTTP/1.1
    Authorization: Bearer eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9.example
    Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
    client-request-id: 5e2a1c90-44bb-4d11-a0e1-77aa11bb22cc
    
    sessionid=sess-01&sessionstate=approve&sessiontype=Passwordless&userobjectid=84b12a9c-0e33-4d1a-9f44-11aa22bb33cc&assertion=eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiJ9.example&entropy=14&oathcounter=48212
    {
      "success": true
    }
  • Register device sign-in key

    POST /v1/devices/keys osint

    Registers the device's public sign-in key with the device-registration service so the handset can later approve passwordless sessions.

    Auth: Authorization: Bearer token scoped for device registration. Sends an api-version query parameter plus client name and SKU headers.

    • publicKeyCredential
    • credentialDisplayName
    • attributes
    • supports_notification
    • message
    • time
    • requestId
    • serverKeyId
    POST /v1/devices/keys?api-version=1.1 HTTP/1.1
    Authorization: Bearer eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9.example
    Content-Type: application/json
    X-Client-Name: AuthenticatorAndroid
    X-Client-SKU: authenticator.android
    
    {
      "publicKeyCredential": {
        "id": "cred-aa11",
        "rawId": "Y3JlZC1hYTEx",
        "type": "public-key",
        "response": {
          "attestationObject": "o2NmbXRkbm9uZWdhdHRTdG10",
          "clientDataJSON": "eyJ0eXBlIjoid2ViYXV0aG4uY3JlYXRlIn0"
        }
      },
      "credentialDisplayName": "Pixel 8",
      "attributes": {
        "supports_notification": "true"
      }
    }
    {
      "message": "Key registered",
      "time": "2026-09-29T12:05:01Z",
      "requestId": "drs-req-01",
      "serverKeyId": "key-8e21c0"
    }
  • Delete device sign-in key

    DELETE /v1/devices/keys/{keyId} osint

    Removes the device sign-in key from the registration service when the work account is deleted or passwordless phone sign-in is turned off.

    Auth: Authorization: Bearer device-registration token. The app resolves the deletion route from discovery metadata and appends an api-version query parameter.

    • keyId
    • upn
    • krctx
    DELETE /v1/devices/keys/key-8e21c0?api-version=1.0 HTTP/1.1
    Authorization: Bearer eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9.example
    X-Client-Name: AuthenticatorAndroid
    X-Client-SKU: authenticator.android
    {
      "keyId": "key-8e21c0",
      "upn": "[email protected]",
      "krctx": "ctx-01"
    }

Data categories

  • mfa registrations
  • push approvals
  • totp secrets
  • passkeys
  • passwordless sessions
  • device tokens
  • auth method policy
  • organization data boundary

Where teams use this data

  • Workforce MFA device inventory

    Read AccountName, PhoneAppDetailId, DeviceName and TenantCountryCode from each device registration plus the DeviceToken rotation events to reconcile which handsets are enrolled as Microsoft Authenticator methods.

  • Number-match and location policy checks

    Pull numberMatchingRequiredState, displayLocationInformationRequiredState and isSoftwareTotpEnabled from the per-user authenticator policy and compare them with firstEntropyNumber and returnLocationData on the live MFA challenge.

  • Passwordless session monitoring

    Watch the pending-sessions list for passwordless sign-ins (username, sessionType, authDetails, fidoChallenge) and complete them with a signed assertion after the user confirms the match code.

  • Passkey lifecycle on Entra ID

    Read passkey creation options, store a platform passkey for the user from its attestation, and remove authenticator or passkey methods when the device is retired.

Frequently asked questions

How does Microsoft Authenticator enroll a work or school account?

The app posts a device registration to /v1/mfa/devices/register with a Bearer token, app and device headers, and an XML body carrying DeviceName, DeviceToken and NotificationType. The response returns AccountName, GroupKey, OathSecret and PhoneAppDetailId plus the tenant routing hints used by later calls.

How are push MFA approvals requested and submitted?

The phone polls /v1/mfa/challenges/poll for a waiting sign-in, loads the challenge from /v1/mfa/challenges/context (firstEntropyNumber digits, sasSessionId, richContextDetails), then posts the decision to /v1/mfa/challenges/result with authenticationResult, isAppLockUsed and oathTokenCounter. When policy requires it, /v1/mfa/challenges/pin validates the app PIN first.

What does the authenticator policy data include?

GET /v1/accounts/{id}/mfa-policy returns the per-user authenticator settings: authenticationMode, numberMatchingRequiredState, displayLocationInformationRequiredState, isSoftwareTotpEnabled and companionAppAllowedState. A separate tenant call, /v1/tenants/security-defaults, reports whether identity security defaults are enabled.

How do passkeys and passwordless sign-in work in the app?

Pending passwordless sessions are listed at /v1/signin/sessions (sessionId, entropy digits, fidoChallenge) and completed at /v1/signin/sessions/approve with a signed assertion. Passkey setup reads options from /v1/accounts/{id}/passkeys/creation-options and stores the credential with POST /v1/accounts/{id}/passkeys; a DELETE on the same resource retires it.

Apps similar to Microsoft Authenticator

  • Google Authenticator — Google's free authenticator app generates TOTP and HOTP one-time codes for Google and third-party accounts, with optional sync to a Google account.
  • Twilio Authy — Twilio's two-factor app offers encrypted cloud backups and multi-device sync so codes survive a phone change.
  • Duo Mobile — Cisco's workforce MFA app handles push approvals and pairs with Duo's risk-based authentication, SSO and device-visibility platform.
  • Okta Verify — Okta's workforce identity app sends push approvals for Okta-managed accounts and is listed among Microsoft Authenticator's direct competitors.
  • Aegis Authenticator — A free, open-source Android authenticator that stores tokens in an encrypted local vault and collects no user data.
  • 2FAS Auth — An open-source authenticator that works offline without requiring an account, with an optional browser extension for quicker sign-ins.
  • Ente Auth — An open-source authenticator from Ente with end-to-end encrypted backups that sync codes across mobile and desktop.

Topics

  • Microsoft Authenticator API
  • MFA push approval API
  • authenticator device registration
  • number matching MFA
  • passwordless phone sign-in
  • FIDO2 passkey registration API
  • OathSecret PhoneAppDetailId
  • authenticator policy API

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